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Abstract: In this article I review critical thought about cosmogony in the social sciences and 
explore the current status of this concept.  The latter agenda entails three components.  First, I 
argue that – even where there is no mention of cosmogony – contemporary anthropological 
projects that reject the essentialist ontology they ascribe to Western modernity in favour of 
analytical versions of relational nondualism thereby posit a counter-cosmogony of eternal 
relational becoming.  Second, I show how Viveiros de Castro has made Amazonian 
cosmogonic myth – read as counter-cosmogony – exemplary of the relational nondualist 
ontology he calls perspectival multinaturalism.  Observing that this counter-cosmogony now 
stands in opposition against biblical cosmogony, I conclude by asking, what are the 
consequences for the study of cosmogony when it becomes a register of what it is about – 
when it becomes, that is, a medium of polemical debate about competing models of 
cosmogony and the practical implications they allegedly entail. 
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Cosmogony Today: Counter-Cosmogony, Perspectivism, and the Return of Anti-
Biblical Polemic 
Michael W. Scott, London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
As has been widely reported in the media, the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) experiments at 
CERN, designed to “unlock the secrets of the universe” (Rincon 2008) by recreating the 
conditions that prevailed within milliseconds of the Big Bang, have been met with enormous 
public interest, but also fears and moral condemnation. 
Some fears have come from within the scientific community itself.  Most famously, 
Otto Rössler, a retired chemistry professor from the University of Tübingen, has argued that 
the experiments could cause microscopic black holes to form that, rather than vanishing 
instantly as other scientists predict, might “grow exponentially and eat the planet from the 
inside” (Rössler in Gray 2008).  Another worrying question has been whether replicating the 
immediate aftermath of the Big Bang might produce “strangelets” – hypothetical aggregates 
of “strange matter” – that could coalesce with ordinary matter and transform the earth into “a 
hot, dead lump” (Rincon 2008).  In 2008, these and other doomsday scenarios prompted 
Walter L. Wagner, a retired U.S. radiation safety officer, to file a lawsuit in the state of 
Hawai‘i aimed at preventing the CERN experiments from starting up.  Wagner’s legal 
challenge failed, but he continues, as leader of Citizens Against the Large Hadron Collider, to 
agitate for closing down the experiments (CERN n.d.b.).
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Popular fiction has also contributed to doubts about the wisdom of reprising the 
primordium.  Dan Brown’s novel Angels and Demons (2001) imagines the esoteric Illuminati 
plotting to annihilate the Vatican with a capsule full of particle accelerator-generated 
antimatter stolen from CERN.  As part of a larger effort to turn the movie version of Brown’s 
bestseller (Howard 2009) into an opportunity for public education, CERN sought to allay 
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fears that such an “antimatter bomb” might be possible, developing webpages dedicated to 
explaining why this kind of device would take too long to produce (about a billion years) and 
be too huge to manoeuver (cern.ch n.d.a). 
In other quarters, a number of Christian bloggers and contributors to online forums 
have objected to the LHC project on the grounds that the CERN scientists are “playing God” 
(e.g., Muir and Muir 2010).  Almost invariably, such commentators liken the LHC to the 
Tower of Babel, the biblical symbol of humanity’s desire “to close the gap between the 
wisdom of God and the knowledge of man” (Mickey 2008; cf. Prata 2012).  Pointing to the 
theoretical doomsday scenarios involving mini black holes and strangelets, they intimate that 
these may well transpire as God’s way of punishing such hubris.  It has even been suggested 
that “[t]he logo of CERN appears to be three sixes superimposed on each other” 
(ChristianForums.com 2011a). 
 
One or Two Things We Know about Cosmogony 
Taken together, the scientific aims of the LHC experiments and the diverse responses they 
have elicited offer striking confirmation of what social scientists claim to know about 
cosmogony, as a conceptual object, based on historical and ethnographic studies of the myths, 
rituals, and metaphysical systems of ancient and indigenous societies.  Cosmogony, which 
may be defined simply as the generation of the universe, is one of the classic loci of inquiry 
for philosophers, historians of religions, and anthropologists.  Obviously, such scholars have 
not investigated the transformations of the early universe by means of experimental methods, 
as do the scientists at CERN; rather, they have taken as their object of study the many and 
varied theories and accounts of origins that people all over the world have devised, debated, 
narrated, and sometimes enacted.  In so doing – by analyzing, documenting, and comparing 
such theories and accounts and their historically conditioned revisions – scholars have 
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developed a set of basic insights that seem to apply as much to contemporary scientific as to 
ancient and indigenous engagements with the idea of the beginning. 
One such insight, for example, is the general tenet that people formulate and look to 
cosmogony as the locus of truth about ontology, as the interval in time and space that 
uniquely discloses two things: the number and nature of fundamental entities or relations that 
exist in the cosmos, and the processes that gave them their current configurations.
2
  Arguably, 
just such a presupposition that origins reveal deeper realities behind present appearances is 
legible in the discourses CERN has formulated to explain its experiments, and consequently 
in the language science journalists have employed to do likewise.  Thus, a CERN-linked 
website publicizing the ATLAS experiment states that “[t]he LHC recreates, on a small scale, 
the conditions of the Universe just after the Big Bang in order to learn why the Universe is 
like it is today” (altas.ch. n.d.a).  More specifically, it does so in order to allow the ATLAS 
detector to register evidence of hypothetical realities: hidden dimensions, unknown forces, 
antimatter, dark matter, and “surprises” (altas.ch. n.d.b).  Concerning the experiment known 
as ALICE, a BBC science correspondent reported that it would attempt to replicate “a special 
state of matter” – the quark-gluon plasma – which existed for only a split-second at the 
beginning of time and was “different from the matter the Universe is formed of now” 
(Moskvitch 2010).  This initial phase of matter, the correspondent informed us, might tell us 
who we really are: “If the researchers at the LHC are able to recreate that state of matter and 
study it, they could get important clues about how it ‘evolved into the kind of matter that can 
make up you and me’” (Moskvitch 2010, quoting CERN spokesman, Dr James Gillies). 
Already legible in such talk about the LHC is support for a second basic insight about 
the concept of cosmogony: accounts of cosmogony imply and often entail rich mythologies 
about a primordial condition – a phase or ongoing, though normally invisible, mode of being 
conceived of as replete with forces that are fantastically generative but also potentially 
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deadly.
3
  Because primordiality is not nothing, but also not yet cosmos (order), the value sign 
(and gender symbol) placed beside it is notoriously unstable.  Often described analytically as 
“chaos”, primordiality stands in a debateable, contextually changeable relationship to order.  
Is it the original, true and abiding flux (soup, plasma?) that belies order?  Is it the well-spring 
of all being on which order depends for periodic renewal and reconfiguration?  Is it the 
enemy of order, always to be contained lest it regain its precedence?  Or is it, in fact, 
antithetical to some other coeval or antecedent form of being that organizes it, banishes it, or 
even wills it into existence out of nothing?  These kinds of perennial questions about the 
nature of primordiality appear, I suggest, to be informing some people’s reactions to the LHC 
project.  If concerns over mini black holes and strangelets began as debates about what 
quantum theory predicts, they quickly intersected with more ambient anxieties that return to 
primordiality may be dangerous.  Could the forces that made us unmake us if unleashed 
again?  And what if those forces fell into the wrong hands? 
The reactions of some Christians to what goes on inside the LHC highlight, I suggest, 
yet a third lesson social science has learned about “cosmogonic thought” (Schrempp 1992: 
55): there is a nexus between people’s ideas about cosmogony and their practices – not only 
their ritual practices, but also their everyday actions, especially their exercise of moral 
reason.
4
  This third insight is really a corollary to the first.  As Geertz put it: “A powerfully 
coercive ‘ought’ is felt to grow out of a comprehensive factual ‘is’” (1973: 126; cf. Knight 
1985: 143).  Accordingly, because we look to accounts of cosmogony for the truth about 
ontology – for our most “comprehensive factual ‘is’” – our sense of what we ought and ought 
not to do is informed by our assumptions about cosmogony.  Through their references to the 
Tower of Babel, Christians who object to the LHC point to biblical accounts of cosmogony 
and primordiality in ways that derive from them a particular ontological and ethical order.  In 
line with conventional understandings of the story, these Christians read the Tower of Babel 
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episode in Genesis 11 as a demonstration that “God steps in whenever man reaches too far” 
(ChristianForums.com 2011b).  Such interpretations rest on an assumption that to be human 
is to occupy a specific ontological position in the cosmos that is limited and policed by God.  
This assumption is linked in turn, I suggest, to the widely held Judeo-Christian view that the 
Bible, especially Genesis 1-3, asserts a difference between God as creator and humanity as 
creature, although the exact nature of this difference – whether it is absolute or somehow 
otherwise – is much contested.  In any case, the implication is that God and humanity now 
have their proper spheres of being and knowledge and that these are vertically asymmetrical.  
Humans, therefore, ought not to attempt to ascend to heaven, but should accept the terrestrial 
finitude of creatureliness.  To underscore this point, the online forum contributor quoted 
above also included in her post the text of Genesis 3:22: “Then the Lord God said, ‘Behold, 
the man has become like one of us, knowing good and evil; and now, lest he put forth his 
hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat and live for ever.’”  According to the next verse, 
it was precisely in order to pre-empt this earlier human bid for divinity that God expelled 
Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden. 
But responses to such responses, and even a cursory web search on the subject, 
quickly indicate that not all Christians or Abrahamic monotheists agree that the LHC is a case 
of humanity overreaching its proper limits.  And this confirms a fourth and crucial thing we 
know about cosmogony: accounts of cosmogony are always multivocal, contested, and 
conditioned by competing interpretations, variants, and rival accounts; for this reason, the 
practical implications of any cosmogonic scenario are never monological, self-evident, or 
irresistibly prescriptive.
5
  Even among those Christians who hold the Bible to be inerrant, the 
LHC has precipitated debates about human nature that index different moral inferences drawn 
from shared scriptural accounts of primordiality.  In reply to those inerrantists who argue that 
the LHC is an expression of humanity’s will to achieve omniscience apart from God and is 
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thus a symptom of fallen human ontology (e.g., Colson 2009), others counter that the LHC is 
an expression of humanity’s unique rational capacity and is thus a manifestation of the image 
of God in human ontology (e.g., Van Sloten 2011; Zweerink 2009).  Likewise, many Jews 
and Muslims, their differences with Christians (and one another) notwithstanding, readily see 
in the LHC an example of humanity fulfilling its God-given abilities and role in the cosmos 
(e.g., Nash 2009; Price 2012). 
Finally, these online discourses, and the threads they generate, illustrate a fifth 
recognized aspect of cosmogony.  They show that the nexus between cosmogony and practice 
works both ways.  Just as people’s accounts of cosmogony can inform their negotiations of 
everyday life, the contingent nature of everyday life, especially the advent of the unexpected 
(in this case, new developments in science, but also ruptures such as colonialism) can change 
people’s understandings of what “is” and therefore move them to reconfigure their accounts 
of cosmogony, or even exchange old accounts for new (cf. Sahlins 1985).
6
  Reactions to the 
LHC make it clear that the Abrahamic faithful feel compelled to grapple, in one way or 
another, with scientific models of cosmogony as potential rivals to models derived from their 
respective scriptures.  Many simply reject scientific alternatives altogether.  But others re-
read their scriptures in ways that, although they might deny it, amount to creating new 
versions without changing a word.  For some, this means reiterating the Cartesian bifurcation 
of ontology into material versus immaterial, ceding authority concerning the genesis of 
matter to science while retaining for scripture, re-read as metaphor, authority concerning 
moral and spiritual truths.  For others, in contrast, this leads to creative reinventions of 
panentheistic understandings, finding warrant in scripture for positing God/spirit as a yet-to-
be-detected kind of matter, a true “God particle,” ingredient in and animating all things.  For 
still others, the challenges of science motivate heroic attempts to convince themselves and 
others that creation and scripture (read correctly) are mutually corroborating revelations, 
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never at variance.
7
  And this list of possibilities is not exhaustive.  Combinations of these and 
other strategies for reconciling scientific accounts of cosmogony with faith in a transcendent 
and/or pervasive creative intentionality could, no doubt, also be found.  Furthermore, it is not 
just a matter of the faithful revising their cosmogonic outlooks in light of science.  Some 
scientists, it appears, revise their theories in order to eliminate the need for a wilful creator as 
encompassing explanation (Rubenstein 2012, 2014).      
This contemporary plurality of cosmogonic models, along with the diversity of 
people’s efforts to sort or integrate them, serves as a forceful reminder that no account of 
cosmogony, however culturally dominant, has ever existed in a vacuum, unconditioned by 
others.  All accounts of cosmogony entail what language theorist Mikhail Bakhtin (1984: 
196) termed “internal” or “hidden polemic”; they implicitly reference and are thus shaped by 
the rival models or existing variants they are designed to contradict, encompass, elaborate, or 
supersede.  They carry their historical others within them as what they have attempted to 
negate or incorporate and as what they may, in new ways, become again.
8
  Having developed 
in contexts of controversy and debate, accounts of cosmogony induce more of the same, 
lending themselves to ongoing dialogic fission and revision.  Given this complexity, the 
practical implications of any cosmogonic model are ambiguous and multiple, contributing to 
disparate, even contrasting, aspects of a particular context or history.  And, conversely, every 
context and history is likely to index the co-existence of more than one cosmogonic model. 
With these basic insights in view, my main objective in this essay is to explore what I 
take to be the current state of play respecting the concept of cosmogony.  To this end, I focus 
on recent discourses within anthropology, the discipline I know best; but, as I will indicate, 
analogous discourses have long been evident in other fields as well.  The claim I will 
elaborate is that anthropology itself is now a means by which some academics are seeking to 
transform what they regard as the essentialist assumptions of Western ontology and, along 
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with these, the models of cosmogony they say inform Western thought and practice 
(including anthropology).  While remaining a locus of ethnographic inquiry into indigenous 
non-Western accounts of cosmogony, anthropology has additionally become the generator 
and promoter of a theoretically posited and preferred model of cosmogony, often employing 
the former to develop the latter. 
In previous work (Scott 2013, 2014), I have drawn attention to the ways in which 
various prominent anthropological projects are theorizing a particular ontology I call 
relational nondualism (discussed below) and are enjoining commitment to this ontology as a 
methodological premise.  Extending these observations, I seek here to highlight how such 
projects also promote a specific model of cosmogony: they privilege images of eternal 
relational becoming that preclude all notions of absolute beginning(s) and the pure categories 
they presuppose.  In order to bring this theoretically posited cosmogony (or meta-
cosmogony) into view, I point to its otherwise non-obvious presence within two different but 
intersecting lines of work in current anthropology.  First, I contend that – even where there is 
no mention of cosmogony as such – anthropological projects that reject modern Western 
essentialism in favor of relational nondualism thereby posit what I will term a “counter-
cosmogony” of eternal relational becoming.  Second, I develop this argument by analyzing 
how Eduardo Viveiros de Castro has made Amazonian cosmogonic myth – read as counter-
cosmogony – exemplary of the relational nondualist ontology he calls perspectival 
multinaturalism.  Having thus precipitated the counter-cosmogony prescribed by these 
projects, I remark finally on a surprising irony: I note an incipient tendency to contrast this 
counter-cosmogony with biblical cosmogony in ways that drastically essentialize both, 
correlating the former wholly with positive and the latter wholly with negative practical 
outcomes.  Accordingly, I conclude by asking, what are the consequences for the study of 
cosmogony when it becomes a transformation of what it is about – when it becomes, that is, a 
10 
 
medium of polemical debate about competing models of cosmogony and the practical 
implications they allegedly entail. 
 
Counter-Cosmogony: The Rejection of Absolute Beginning(s) 
It might immediately be objected that models of eternal becoming are not accounts of 
cosmogony at all, but rejections of the concept of cosmogony itself.  Such an objection 
presupposes that the concept of cosmogony pertains only to absolute beginnings.  I am 
employing and advocating a more capacious understanding of cosmogony, however.  Like 
those scholars who argue that the Buddhist teaching known as “dependent origination” is a 
cosmogonic doctrine (Reynolds 1985: 205), I take a more inclusive view that recognizes 
models of continual relational emergence as cosmogonic (cf. Rubenstein 2012, 2014).  That 
said, I propose to call the models of eternal relational becoming now evident in many 
anthropological projects counter-cosmogonies, where “counter” is an acronym for 
continuous, open, unoriginated, nonlinear, transformational, emergent, and relational 
cosmogonic processes.  With this shorthand, I seek to recognize that many of the 
anthropologists whose work foregrounds continuous becoming do not characterize it as 
cosmogony and might, in fact, wish to offer continuous becoming as an alternative to 
cosmogony, understood in the narrower sense of absolute origins.  My term counter-
cosmogony is thus a deliberate contradiction; it asserts that the accounts of infinite 
generativity to which it refers both are and are not cosmogonies. 
The anthropological projects I have in mind are those that theorize and strive to adopt 
a methodological meta-ontology of relational nondualism.  By meta-ontology I mean the 
ontological assumptions, whether implicit or intentionally formulated, that theorists and 
ethnographers bring to and/or derive from their studies (Scott 2014).  Since the late twentieth 
century, a number of influential anthropologists have been drawing a contrast between the 
11 
 
dualist ontology they ascribe to Euro-American modernity and diverse but mutually 
intelligible versions of a relational nondualist meta-ontology they conceptualize and endorse 
with reference to ethnographic others (e.g., Evens 2008; Ingold 2000: 11-26, 87-110; Kohn 
2013; Latour 1993; Rose 2011; Strathern 2004; Viveiros de Castro 2012; Wagner 1981).  
Briefly put, the contrast between these ontologies goes like this. 
Contributors to the development of relational nondualism as an anthropological meta-
ontology have critiqued Euro-American modernity, especially modern science, as predicated 
on an essentialist ontology they variously term Cartesian or Kantian dualism.  According to 
these critiques, Cartesian moderns presuppose two pure and mutually exclusive ontological 
categories: the immaterial and the material.  This master dichotomy underpins a series of 
analogous hierarchical oppositions, all of which extend but remain reducible to these two 
essential terms: mind/body, subject/object, transcendent/immanent, concept/thing, and 
culture/nature.  Within “nature” as thus conceived of by Cartesian moderns, this dichotomy 
furthermore informs the hierarchical oppositions animate/inanimate and human/animal. 
At the same time, this basic dualism generalizes into a pervasive essentialism, 
characteristic of ontological monisms as well as pluralisms.  Under such essentialist regimes, 
the law of non-contradiction applies to everything; a thing is essentially itself and nothing 
else, and nothing can be itself and something else at the same time.  As the most fundamental 
opposition to which this law applies, the immaterial/material dichotomy is thus the exemplary 
analogue behind every x/not-x opposition.  Critics of this ontology are quick to point out that 
absolute monisms, whether idealist or materialist, do not overcome this fundamental dualist 
essentialism.  Rather, by reducing everything to either the immaterial or the material, these 
options cast one of the two terms as ultimately unreal and epiphenomenal to the other; in so 
doing they re-assert rather than eliminate the purity and incompatibility of these two 
categories. 
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This dualist essentialism is also said to motivate a practice of domination.  The 
modern Cartesian person allegedly assimilates every relation to the hierarchical relation 
between transcendent immaterial subject and inert material object and treats the latter as 
passively available for appropriation, analysis, consumption, or annihilation.  While many 
anthropologists agree that this approach has yielded the achievements of modern science and 
technology, they also argue that it has fostered both political and epistemological 
imperialism.  Cartesian moderns have, by this account, not only empowered themselves as 
the only fully human subjects fit to rule over others, they have also privileged their science as 
the only true representation of nature, in contrast to which the representations of others are 
merely more or less erroneous cultural constructions. 
As an alternative to this dualist-essentialist ontology and its double-edged practical 
consequences, a number of anthropologists have been recommending methodological 
reorientation to a relational nondualist ontology they position as flowing from and consonant 
with the lifeways of many non-Western indigenous people, particularly those of Melanesia, 
Australia, Amazonia, Inner Asia, and the circumpolar north.  The ethnographic record shows, 
these anthropologists suggest, that whereas Cartesian dualists encounter a world full of 
discontinuous bounded things, people in these regions engage with things as composed of and 
composing relations.  For these indigenous relational nondualists, there are allegedly no pure 
autonomously arising essences or categories; instead, everything participates in the ongoing 
emergence of new but intrinsically kindred forms in endlessly ramifying and reconnecting 
trajectories and networks of becoming.  Inspired by their fieldwork immersions in such 
modes of becoming, some anthropologists are developing ethnographically theorized versions 
of relational nondualism and promoting them as ethically preferable to Cartesianism.  
Relational nondualism is better than Cartesianism, it is said, because it offers no ontological 
impetus to or grounds for regimes of absolute truth or the formation of static hierarchies.  In 
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the unbegun and open flow of relations, nothing enjoys perfect precedence over anything 
else.  There are no elementary forms or form to which everything reduces; everything is 
nothing but a contingent, particular, transient multiplicity in the midst of disintegrating and 
becoming-other(s).  Accordingly, it is said, there is no transcendence beyond the “flat 
ontology” of relational nondualism; everything, whether human or animal, animate or 
inanimate, inheres in the same tissue of immanence as a coequal subject and agent.  It is 
claimed, furthermore, that where such anarchic mutability is taken for granted, egalitarian 
forms of reciprocity and mutual care have the best chance of flourishing. 
In the anthropological literature that has elaborated this contrast between Cartesian 
dualism and relational nondualism, the concepts of ontology and cosmology have been far 
more in evidence than that of cosmogony.  I take the position, however, that to describe a 
cosmology as entailing an ontology of relational nondualism (by one name or another) is to 
describe a cosmology that implies eternal becoming, or counter-cosmogony.  Where there is 
relational non-dualism, cosmology and counter-cosmogony become synonymous.  I would 
argue, therefore, that examples of this phenomenon – i.e., the ethnographic or theoretical 
characterization of a relational nondualist cosmology or ontology that implies and thus 
constitutes a counter-cosmogony – include: Tim Ingold’s account of “animacy” as 
“continuous birth” (2011: 67-75); Eduardo Kohn’s model of universal semiosis in “an ever-
emerging world beyond the human” (2013: 66); Morten Axel Pedersen’s analysis of 
shamanism as “an ontology of transition” (2011: 35); Martin Holbraad’s conceptualization of 
a “motile ontology” with an always emergent and changing “motile truth” (2012); Roy 
Wagner’s “holographic worldview” (2001); Marilyn Strathern’s practice of drawing “partial 
connections” from a “postplural perception of the world” (2004); Bruno Latour’s “actor-
network-theory” (2005); and Terry Evens’s nondualism of “ambiguity or between-ness” 
(2008). 
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Amazonian Cosmogony: The Charter Myth of Perspectival Anthropology 
There is another project, however – one that intersects in one way or another with almost all 
of those just mentioned – in which cosmogony, by that name, holds pride of place.  This is 
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s development of “perspectival anthropology” as a 
methodological approach inspired by his understandings of Amerindian perspectival 
animism.  It would be an overstatement to say that Viveiros de Castro’s analytical accounts of 
Amerindian perspectivism are based on his readings of Amerindian cosmogonic myth alone, 
yet these readings are unquestionably central to his expositions of perspectivism.  They 
therefore likewise provide key imagery for thinking about and understanding his proposals 
for a perspectival anthropology. 
Viveiros de Castro has elaborated the concept of perspectival animism based on his 
own and other anthropologists’ work in a variety of contexts, chiefly in Amazonia but also 
well beyond Lowland South America.  In all its diversity, the common denominator that 
constitutes perspectivism as “an indigenous theory” (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 47) is a 
presumption that some animal species, and often other kinds of entities, are in fact persons 
who see themselves as human; by this theory, human personhood is common, if not 
universal, to a great diversity of bodies.  These bodies, furthermore, condition this common 
humanity differently, yielding a plurality of incommensurate perspectives.  Among the 
Campa of eastern Peru, for example, the entities the Campa see as jaguars see Campa as 
peccaries to be hunted, while among the Akuryió of Surinam, the entities the Akuryió see as 
maggots on rotten meat are seen by vultures as fish.  These different perspectives are not 
perspectives on a world, according to Viveiros de Castro, but are worlds themselves, 
generated by differently abled bodies as different arrangements of “the common original 
ground of being” that is human personhood (2004a: 6). 
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Attention to cosmogonic myth is not always a feature of ethnographic descriptions of 
what perspectivism looks like in the daily lives of Amerindians.  Yet, as exemplified in the 
phrase just quoted, Viveiros de Castro consistently appeals to Amerindian ideas about an 
original condition – and to one Campa cosmogonic paradigm in particular – as especially 
revealing of the onto-logic that informs the assumptions and practices of perspectival 
animists.  In a recent restatement of his ideas, he even asserts that what he calls perspectivism 
is “a doctrine explicitly elaborated in shamanism and native mythologies” and that it 
“originates in indigenous cosmogonies” (2013: 4).  He thus reinforces the anthropological 
wisdom according to which there is a nexus between the accounts of cosmogony people 
formulate and look to for the truth about ontology and their everyday moral reasoning and 
practices.  In so doing, he effectively positions Amerindian cosmogonic myth, and more 
importantly his analytical claims about it, as a kind of charter myth behind all perspectivism, 
including the “perspectival anthropology” he seeks to promote (Viveiros de Castro 2004a).  
Moreover, in dialogue with the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, he establishes this charter 
cosmogony of perspectivism as counter-cosmogony. 
With only slight variations, versions of the following text have appeared in many of 
Viveiros de Castro’s publications: “if there is a virtually universal Amerindian notion, it is 
that of an original state of undifferentiation between humans and animals, described in 
mythology” (1998: 471; cf. 2004b: 464; 2005: 40; 2012: 55).  This state of undifferentiation, 
he goes on to explain, is humanity, but not humanity as we know it; it is an original cosmic 
humanity conceived of as “the matter of the primordial plenum, or the original form of just 
about everything” (2005: 40).  Beyond the evidences of everyday perspectivism, which are 
said to point to this primordial humanity, Viveiros de Castro’s favorite ethnographic support 
for these assertions is Gerard Weiss’s account of a Campa cosmogonic paradigm: 
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Campa mythology is largely the story of how, one by one, the primal Campa became 
irreversibly transformed into the first representatives of various species of animals and 
plants, as well as astronomical bodies or features of the terrain. … The development 
of the universe then, has been primarily a process of diversification, with mankind as 
the primal substance out of which many if not all of the categories of beings and 
things in the universe arose, the Campa of today being the descendants of those 
ancestral Campa who escaped being transformed. (Weiss 1972: 169-170, in Viveiros 
de Castro 2004b: 465; 2005: 41; 2012: 56; cf. 2007: 157-159) 
 
This account of cosmogony has become, perhaps especially for non-Amazonianists interested 
in perspectivism, the Amerindian cosmogony, implicitly standing in for all of the otherwise 
unelaborated myths to which Viveiros de Castro refers in his explications of perspectivism.  
It is as if one were tacitly invited always to have this model of cosmogony in mind whenever 
thinking about perspectivism and its broader analytical, methodological, or political 
implications. 
Now, myths that seem to index an “original state of undifferentiation” are well 
documented globally and have often been interpreted as evidence of monism – the idea that 
everything in the cosmos originates from one homogenous categorical source that thus unites 
all apparent discontinuity in underlying identity of being.
9
  But Viveiros de Castro is at pains 
to argue that the primordial humanity constituting “the common original ground of being” 
(2004a: 4) in Amazonia is not an all-encompassing monad that has divided into externally 
varied but internally consubstantial and pure fragments of its uniformly self-same being.  
Rather, the primordial human of Amazonian cosmogony is, by Viveiros de Castro’s 
reckoning, a true plenum not a plane, a multiplicity not a monolith.  “This pre-cosmos”, he 
writes, “very far from displaying any ‘indifferentiation’ or originary identification between 
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humans and nonhumans, as is usually formulated, is pervaded by an infinite difference” 
(Viveiros de Castro 2007: 157, italics original).  It is “a state of being where bodies and 
names, souls and affects, the I and the Other interpenetrate, submerged in the same immanent 
pre-subjective and pre-objective milieu, the demise of which (ever incomplete, always 
undone) is precisely what the mythology sets out to tell” (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 55-56).  
This is to say that Amazonian primordial humanity amounts to an original and abiding 
ontology of relational nondualism, a flux without singular beginning and replete with infinite 
possibilities for transformation.  Amazonian cosmogony appears, in short, as counter-
cosmogony in Viveiros de Castro’s perspectivist project. 
 In order to articulate what he takes to be the crucial distinction between this counter-
cosmogony and any supposedly monistic cosmogony, Viveiros de Castro draws on an array 
of concepts and terms adapted from Deleuzian metaphysics.  The primordial human or 
“original state of undifferentiation” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 471) thus becomes “the ground 
of pre-cosmological virtuality”, characterized by “intensive multiplicity”, or “self-difference” 
(2007: 158).  It is “a background molecular humanity” (2007: 155) from which speciated 
bodies are “actualised” as distinct “molar blocks” (2007: 158-159).  At the same time, 
however, these bodies, despite the homogeneity of their respective species, retain the infinite 
multiplicity of the virtual as intrinsic potentiality.  This means, as Holbraad and Willerslev 
have observed, that 
 
Each being has the potential to transform into every other because all beings (or at 
least all the cosmologically significant species that enter into this perspectivist game) 
contain each other’s perspectives immanently.  Beings can “become-other”, in 
Viveiros de Castro’s Deleuzian terminology, because in a crucial sense they already 
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“are other”: they are constituted as beings by their very potential to become something 
else. (2007: 330) 
 
Obviously, such an ontology knows no law of non-contradiction.  Everything that matters is 
always already itself and, simultaneously, everything else that matters as well.  This does not 
mean that becoming-other is easy, however.  In fact, it is usually reserved for shamans, who 
specialize in techniques of “translation” between perspectives.  Yet the upshot of this 
Deleuzian counter-cosmogony is an ontology of infinite fractal multiplicity in which all 
significant actual bodies entail the plenum of the virtual as common humanity or “soul.”10 
Significantly, monistic cosmogony is not the only essentialist model of origins that 
Viveiros de Castro problematizes vis-à-vis his reading of Amazonian myth as counter-
cosmogony.  As an aside in his famous University of Cambridge lectures of 1998, he seeks to 
marginalize both creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing) and “the fashioning of some prior 
substance into a new type of being” (2012: 57; cf. 2004b: 477).  These both involve, he 
suggests, “the imposition of mental design over formless matter” (2012: 58) and thus seem to 
hint at a road generally not taken in Amazonia towards something like mind/matter dualism.  
Creation ex nihilo, he asserts, is extremely rare, if not virtually absent, in Amazonian 
mythology.  Accounts of demiurges who wilfully make something old into something new 
are found, he acknowledges, but the work of such creators appears to be negatively valued; it 
always results in a defective product.  In this way, Viveiros de Castro treats these cosmogonic 
paradigms as anomalous in Amazonia.  They constitute what he terms a “creation-invention” 
or “creation-production” paradigm of origins that he positions as in tension with the 
“transformation-transference” paradigm characteristic of most Amazonian myth (2012: 58).  
The former, he notes, is “our archetypal model” of agency and creativity (2012: 58; cf. 
Descola 2013: 323-324).  Arguably, however, this attempt to side-line “their” versions of 
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cosmogonic paradigms that resemble “ours” functions to purify Amazonian cosmogonic 
myth of its own intrinsic self-differences, its internal debates about ontology, and ultimately 
its capacities for becoming-other. 
Viveiros de Castro’s recommendations for a perspectival anthropology have placed 
his Deleuzian translations of Amazonian cosmogony at the forefront of efforts, currently 
attractive to many, to reconfigure the discipline of anthropology.  Via their engagement with 
Viveiros de Castro’s project, many anthropologists are now looking to Amazonian 
cosmogony, read as counter-cosmogony, for insight into a relational nondualist ontology they 
see as having significant implications for the ethics and practice of anthropology (e.g., Blaser 
2013; Hage 2012; Holbraad 2012; Holbraad and Willerslev 2007; Pedersen 2011). 
In brief, perspectival anthropology adapts Amerindian perspectivism to the 
ethnographic method as a meta-perspectivism; ethnographic Others and their contexts can 
thus be thought of as “actualization[s] of unsuspected virtualities” or unknown perspectival 
bodies, and the anthropologist can be likened to the shaman whose role is to move between 
and translate different perspectives (Viveiros de Castro 2003; 2004a).  This approach, its 
advocates claim, overcomes the modern dualist (i.e., essentialist) epistemological hierarchy 
according to which scientific knowledge is superior to all other representations of the world.
11
  
Perspectival anthropology is said to do away with this problem by shifting from epistemology 
to ontology.  Its practitioners do not ask about different ways of knowing the world; they ask 
about different ways of being different worlds, different actualizations of the virtual.  
Rethinking fieldwork as akin to the way a shaman puts on the skin or feathers of another 
species in order to acquire its capacities, perspectival anthropologists seek temporarily to 
inhabit another perspective.  They then return home, equipped with experiential resources for 
imagining new possibilities for becoming-other.  This does not mean becoming identical to 
the others they have known in the field.  Above all, it seems to mean pointing to and 
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demonstrating the previously unrecognized scope for onto-political metamorphosis that all 
persons and contexts entail (Viveiros de Castro, Pedersen, and Holbraad 2014).  By being 
sites of generative relation between perspectives, perspectival anthropologists become, not 
only shaman-like but also like the spirits shamans themselves resemble; they become 
“testimony to the fact that not all virtualities were actualised [in their home contexts] and that 
the…riverrun of fluent metamorphosis continues its turbulent course not too far below the 
surface discontinuities separating” different people (Viveiros de Castro 2007: 159).  Aspiring 
to transform themselves, and perhaps also their societies, perspectival anthropologists aim to 
effect, not a regenerative replay of cosmogony (sensu Eliade), but an empowering disclosure 
of counter-cosmogony as constant cosmogony. 
 
Counter-Cosmogony versus Biblical Cosmogony: Scholarship in and as Debate 
Cosmogony remains of vital importance, then, as a focus of ethnographic enquiry and as a 
key referent in current theoretical and methodological innovation.  To be more specific, a 
counter-cosmogony of eternal relational becoming is now influential in anthropology, not 
only as object of ethnographic analysis, but also as theoretical model and methodological 
premise.  It remains to be observed, however, that accounts of this counter-cosmogony have 
always implied an analytical foil and have also pointed at times to an historically particular 
one.  In the previous section, I suggested that Viveiros de Castro’s Deleuzian reading of 
Amazonian cosmogony has emerged as an icon of nondualist ontology.  To this I would add 
that biblical cosmogony – read as a hard dualism – is emerging as its opposite, the icon and, 
indeed, the ultimate origin of modern essentialism in all its forms (monism, dualism, and 
pluralism). 
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Don Handelman, for example, has recently located the origin of the notion of absolute 
transcendence, and with it the invention of mutually exclusive ontological categories, 
squarely within biblical cosmogony, read as the creation of x by not-x: 
 
The emergence of monotheism eventually came to posit the absolute separation of 
God the transcendent Creator from humankind. … Herewith and underlined is the 
contrast between a cosmos that holds together from within itself through itself, and 
the emerging monotheistic cosmos of the Hebrew God who is boundless, infinite, 
unnameable, unfathomable, creating His finite cosmos as one ruptured from himself. 
… The monotheistic cosmos turned the perfection of the human being into the divine 
purpose of the universe, yet set before human being the goal of organising the world 
into one that was truly, only, and solely human.  For as various scholars (e.g. Bruno 
Latour) have commented, in the worlds that eventually derived from monotheism 
most living beings who were other-than-human were either killed off, reduced in their 
communicative capacities with humans, or, treated as inert, no longer were perceived 
as living. (Handelman 2014: 99) 
 
Already in 1998, at the close of his Cambridge lectures, Viveiros de Castro had 
suggested something consonant.  With a sense of last resort, he confided, “I am led to ask 
whether our naturalistic monism is not the last avatar of our monotheistic cosmology” (2012: 
151).  He then answered himself in the affirmative:  
 
Our ontological dualisms derive in the last instance from the same monotheism, for 
they all derive from the fundamental difference between Creator and creature. … 
[O]ur monistic ontologies are always derived from some prior duality, they consist 
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essentially in the amputation of one of the poles, or in the absorption (linear or 
“dialectical”) of the amputed [sic] pole by the remaining one. (Viveiros de Castro 
2012: 151-152) 
 
This claim, that biblical cosmogony, with its allegedly non-negotiable assertion of an 
ontological gap between creator and creation, indexes the innovation of the concept of 
absolute transcendence and with it the possibility of radical difference, is of course not new 
(e.g., Frankfort and Frankfort 1946; Glacken 1967: 151-153, 196-197).  But it has been and 
remains controversial, meaning different things to different people.  For some – especially, 
but not exclusively, the monotheistic faithful – versions of this claim have been about 
identifying the source of many benefits.  According to these versions, the notion of divine 
transcendence inscribed in biblical cosmogony signalled a kind of enlightenment, a quantum 
leap forward in consciousness, evidence of the “higher”, if not in fact revealed, status of 
biblical religion vis-à-vis “primitive nature worship”, and the sine qua non behind the 
development of Western civilization’s rationality, historical consciousness, humane ethics, 
and social justice (e.g., Cahill 1998; Johnson 1987; Roberts 1993: 90-95).  For others – both 
Jew and Gentile, theist and post-theist among them – versions of the claim have been about 
identifying the source of many ills.  According to these versions, as we have seen, the notion 
of divine transcendence inscribed in biblical cosmogony signalled a kind of Fall, a loss of 
consciousness of the different but related subjectivities of non-humans, the reduction of 
everything tangible to dead matter, and justifications for the human conquest and exhaustion 
of the planet (e.g., Eliade 1954; Feuerbach 1854: 111-118). 
Nor is anthropology the only field in which new variants of the latter are appearing.  
For several decades now, the concept of a single radically transcendent god, and the 
understandings of biblical cosmogony that have underpinned this concept, have been under 
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critique in diverse disciplines as the sources of Western ideologies of patriarchy, 
anthropocentrism, and domination.  This critique of monotheism has been a focus of intense 
debate in theology itself, especially in the allied areas of feminist and eco-theology (e.g., 
Bauman 2009; Keller 2003), but also in environmental ethics (e.g., Yaffe 2001), ancient Near 
Eastern studies (e.g., Assmann 2008), and literature-based critical theory (e.g., Schwartz 
1997). 
To my knowledge, no controversy has yet arisen in anthropology over the telescoping 
of critiques of modern essentialism into critiques of biblical cosmogony and monotheism.  
Yet, arguably, the rather stark and value-laden contrast now perceptible in some 
anthropological discourses between the counter-cosmogony of eternal relational becoming 
and biblical cosmogony, cast as creator/creation dualism, constitutes the return of the old 
problem of determinism in the study of cosmogony. 
A well-known charge against studies that find a nexus between accounts of 
cosmogony and human actions is that such studies treat rituals and histories as the routinized 
and virtually agentless enactments of mythic scripts (e.g., on Mircea Eliade, see Ellwood 
1999: 104-114; on Marshall Sahlins, see Friedman 1987).  Such studies, it is claimed, portray 
people’s practical choices as determined by models they have little power to resist or alter; 
such studies exhibit a certain kind of essentialism, in other words.  They effectively assert 
that accounts of cosmogony encode core dynamics that remain essentially the same over 
time, despite shifts to new registers of practice, or even the apparent jettisoning of mythic 
traditions altogether. 
These criticisms notwithstanding, some anthropologists today appear to be saying 
something similar about the nexus between biblical cosmogony and Western essentialism in 
all its alleged manifestations.  Despite their rejection of absolute origins, they appear to single 
out biblical cosmogony as the unique first cause behind a host of negatively valued practical 
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outcomes in Western history.  Conversely, they appear at the same time to cast the counter-
cosmogony of eternal relational becoming as the multi-sited source of a host of positively 
valued outcomes in non-Western contexts, especially universal subjectivity and limitless 
potential for becoming-other. 
Disturbingly, this picture seems both right and wrong.  Undoubtedly, dualist 
understandings of biblical cosmogony have indeed contributed to coercive tendencies and 
destructive events in Western history, and continue to do so.  But they have also contributed 
to benevolent tendencies and great achievements.  It may also be readily pointed out that 
dualist understandings of biblical cosmogony have not been the only models of cosmogony – 
or even the only biblically-based models of cosmogony – informing Western practice.  
Analogous qualifications apply equally, of course, to the complexities of cosmogony and 
practice in non-Western contexts.  Undoubtedly, models of eternal relational becoming have 
contributed to modes of exchange and reciprocity and to negligible ecological impact in the 
indigenous societies where such models prevail.  But they have also contributed to modes of 
inter-human predation that can lock certain bodies into prey positions vis-à-vis others with 
little possibility of becoming-other in this life.  It seems self-evident, in fact, that every model 
of cosmogony entails its own ethical assets and challenges and that what may appear a 
“better” cosmogony today may become “worse” from the point of view of tomorrow.  No 
cosmogony is the royal road to either catastrophe or utopia (cf. Descola 2013: 402-406; Scott 
2014: 47-48).  As we have seen, moreover, even in Amazonia there are intimations of 
cosmogonic models other than eternal relational becoming; this must be true as well in other 
non-Western contexts. 
What, then, is the upshot of all this for the ongoing study of cosmogony?  If we 
remain persuaded that there is a nexus between cosmogony and practice, but we want to 
avoid the distortions of determinism, how might we best study cosmogony? 
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Two opportunities for further study immediately suggest themselves.  On the one 
hand, we may take the study of cosmogony itself as a fieldsite, as a forum in which accounts 
of cosmogony are formulated and debated.  This involves hesitating to take at face value the 
historical and ethnographic claims that scholars make about particular accounts of 
cosmogony and recognizing that such scholarship, in so far as it participates in cosmogony-
making and debating, proceeds via essentialism as polemical technique.  This option is 
particularly interesting, furthermore, because the present state of the study of cosmogony may 
afford special insight into the ways in which new findings or situations – such as the results 
of the LHC experiments at CERN or evidence of climate change – can motivate people to 
exchange one model of cosmogony for another or revise how they understand an existing 
one. 
On the other hand, we may also seek to complexify the historical and ethnographic 
study of cosmogony by attending more closely to the debated and dialogic nature of 
cosmogonic accounts in particular contexts and histories.  This involves resisting the 
temptation to side-line minority or “heterodox” models of cosmogony as anomalous and 
inconsequential and recognizing that alternative and suppressed models find practical and 
concrete expressions.  With respect to non-Western contexts and histories, this could mean, 
among other things, allowing for the possibility of cosmogonic models that suggest non-
Cartesian pluralisms (e.g., Puett 2002; Scott 2007; 2014).  With respect to the West, it would 
recommend considerations of non-biblical accounts of cosmogony that have co-existed with 
and informed biblical interpretation – such as Platonic and Neoplatonic models – and their 
ongoing transformations.
12
  Furthermore, in light of Viveiros de Castro’s Deleuzian analysis 
of Amazonian cosmogony – and as he himself seems to hint (2007: 164) – it might also 
include asking whether these non-biblical accounts all imply monism, or whether there have 
ever been (pre-Deleuzian) indigenous Western nondualisms.  Have there, in fact, been 
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nondualist readings of biblical cosmogony and ontology that have escaped anthropological 
attention (cf. Scott 2015)? 
It turns out, however, that such efforts to complexify and add nuance to the study of 
cosmogony are not so easy to disambiguate from the debates of cosmogony-making.  The 
approaches to the study of cosmogony I have just urged upon anthropologists correlate in 
many respects with those taken by apologists, reformers, and innovators when they seek to 
defend, amend, or reconfigure biblical religion in response to the many now pervasive 
critiques of biblical cosmogony and monotheism. 
Some thinkers attempt, for example, to reaffirm the creator/creation distinction by 
arguing that more good can flow from it than from any turn to models of cosmogony that 
imply universal continuity of being; if properly understood, they argue, the creator/creation 
distinction provides the best ontological ground for creature-to-creature openness and self-
giving (e.g., Williams 2000: 63-78).  Others accept and add to critiques of dualistic 
understandings of biblical cosmogony, but in so doing they also implicate accounts of 
cosmogony from the ancient Near East and Greece as having contributed to a Western logic 
of domination (e.g., Bauman 2009: 12-32; Ruether 1993: 15-31).  They then excavate 
resources from within the history of biblical religion for recovering and/or innovating 
alternative readings of biblical texts.  This can take the form of drawing on esoteric material 
such as Jewish Kabbala (e.g., Moltmann 1993), or exchanging the normative doctrine of 
creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing) for versions of “a post-foundational, relational 
understanding of creatio continua [continuous creation]” (Bauman 2009: 171).  Some 
theological projects are even remarkably consonant with perspectival anthropology, 
appealing to the philosophy of Deleuze to radically rethink God as multiplicity (e.g., 
Schneider 2008).  Complexification can, in sum, be as polemical a technique as essentialism. 
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Add, therefore, a sixth thing we know about cosmogony: the study of cosmogony is a 
register of cosmogony-making; in the genres of scholarship and critical thought, it carries on 
and thus lends itself to the formulating and debating of competing models of cosmogony and 
the habits of thought and action they are said to foster. 
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Hadron Collider (lhcdefense.org n.d.). 
 
40 
 
                                                                                                                                       
2
 Examples of studies that have proposed or built critically on this claim about cosmogony 
include Eliade 1967; Lincoln 1986; Puett 2002; Sahlins 1985; Schrempp 1992; Scott 2007; 
Viveiros de Castro 1992. 
 
3
 According to the influential but controversial theorist of cosmogony, Mircea Eliade, all 
myth is cosmogonic myth, dealing precisely with this mode of primordiality he famously 
dubbed illo tempore, “that time”.  See, Eliade (1963: 5-6) and compare Eduardo Viveiros de 
Castro’s Deleuzian update (2007: 157). 
 
4
 On this point, see for example, Eliade 1959; Lovin and Reynolds 1985; Malinowski 1948: 
93-148; Sahlins 1985; Schrempp 1992; Scott 2007. 
 
5
 For articulations and illustrations of this basic principle, developed in analytical relation to 
diverse ancient and contemporary examples, see the essays in Lovin and Reynolds, eds. 1985; 
Puett 2002; Schrempp 1992; Scott 2005; Valeri 2014. 
 
6
 See, for example, the analyses in McDonald 2001: 76-97; Scott 2007: 261-324; Smith 1982: 
66-89. 
 
7
 See, for example, the literature produced by Reasons to Believe (reasons.org. n.d.) and the 
Qur’an Project (quran.project.org. n.d.). 
 
8
 On the evidence for these polemical dynamics in the formation of Genesis 1:1-2:3, see 
Levenson 1988. 
 
41 
 
                                                                                                                                       
9
 For a discussion of monistic interpretations of cosmogonic models such as the separation of 
sky and earth, the cosmic egg, the primordial androgyne, the dismemberment of the 
primordial man, etc., see Valeri 2014. 
 
10
 Here the insisted upon distinction between monism and infinite fractal multiplicity 
arguably becomes elusive, not simply because refusal to choose between monism and 
pluralism looks like “half-hearted monism” (Harman 2011: 9), but because fractality suggests 
the same infinite intensive difference at every scale, rendering differentiation both endless 
and impossible.  The virtual can be difficult to distinguish from underlying identity of being. 
 
11
 Such claims that perspectival anthropology and other methodological turns to nondualism 
truly dethrone scientific epistemology in this way demand critical scrutiny beyond the scope 
of this essay.  I would argue, in fact, that most of the anthropological theorizations of 
nondualism I have cited in this article are informed by, and indeed made possible by, 
dialogue with the physical sciences.  Many appeal directly to models from such fields as 
developmental biology, biosemiotics, and fractal theory; others do so indirectly whenever 
they appeal to Deleuze, who aspired to develop a philosophical ontology that was 
accountable to science.  Some suggest that relational nondualism is vindicated by science 
(e.g., Viveiros de Castro 2012: 153). 
 
12
 Examples of this already exist in anthropology, of course.  Although Viveiros de Castro 
cites Sahlins’s influential article, “The Sadness of Sweetness” (1996), in support of his 
suggestion that monotheism is the root of Western essentialism, Sahlins acknowledges that, 
in that essay, “insufficient attention has been paid to alternative traditions” (1996: 395).  
More recently he has widened the net of his analysis to capture the ways in which models of 
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cosmogony from ancient Greece still inform Euro-American assumptions about “human 
nature” and even US military strategies (Sahlins 2008).  Similarly, Philippe Descola, in his 
account of the history of Western “naturalism” (his term for modern dualism) considers the 
role of ancient Greek as well as biblical models of cosmogony and argues that the 
“cosmogenesis of modernity” is “a complex process in which many factors are inextricably 
intermingled” (2013: 63, 68). 
